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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
Military intervention in the political affairs of a nation has become a 
phenomenon in today's world. It is worth noting, however, that political philo-
sopbers have usually considered it UJlaatural0 Due to the fact that social sci-
entiats have refused to accept this •s � natural occurenca, studies on this to-
pie have been ff'.w and limited. The major works done in this area have been in 
the form.of articl�s. As early as the 19301s military intervention into politics 
was consid�red �s an ab�rration. 
Samuel P. Huntingtom, Morris Janowitz and other authors on military insti� 
tutions in developing areas, have identified $everal factors which tend to re� 
tard scholaxly research in this field. These include: a) personal values of so­
cial scientists; b) the intellectual postures which tend to discourage such re­
search; c) the iuberent S€crecy of military institutions; d) the political sensi� 
tivity of this type of rese�rch with regards to the leaders of these nations; 
c) the pervasiveness of liberal ideology which tends to either ignore the milit�ry 
1 
or to treat it as an aberration. 
However this topic has come into sharper focus lately due to the repeated occur-
rence of military take-overs in the developing nations. The latest coup happ�ned 
in September of 1973 in Chile when the military took over the government of Allende. 
As the governmental agencies of these countries are being replaced by military 
personnel, a large amount of the n•tion;l budg�t is allocated to military expendi-
-2-
tureso In Afric2 o:.lone with a popula tion of 270,000,000 the militr,ry �xpenditure 
2 
in 1966 was eight billion dollars. With � figure like: this , one: is tcmpttd to 
criticize such milit�ry expenditur�s when the people 0f these nations remain un-
educated, hungry :..:.nd sick. Hi th regards to the defense budget a.s a. percent of the 
Gross National Product, Zaire comes first with an e xpenditure ;_mou."1.ting to 5 o9%o 
Somali• comes second with a 5.0�� followed by Congo Brazzaville with a 4. 7%. lbli 
and Sudan come fourth with a 3.5% whil� Ghana. takes the eight<:.-i:nth �ositior: with 
3 
NETHODOWGY 
I intend to use Ghana..ia.n milite:.ry ex?eri�ncc �.s a c�sc study and to cornpar(:: 
empirica l data of the civilian r-egime of Kt·:2...r.ii Nkrum-.h (1960-1966) v.-i tb ":.hat of :,he 
military rt: gime thGtt overthrew him (1966-1969). In so doing, one should be 2.bl�· to 
make a re&listic judgement as to which of thesa govarnments is the more moderni-
zing agent. By modcrr.ization, I mean the ::iegree to wtich the military and the 
civilian governments brought development in Ghana in terms of ci.d�qucite social �-?cl-
fare programs, more schools, more he�lth f2cilities and better housing. 
Hy data come from two primary sources. One; will be economic statistics from 
the Gh:;;.naian Emb.:3s sy in Wi.shington. Materia.l from this source includes reports of 
the various coflll1'1issions of inq·u.iry set up by the military National Liberation Coun-
cil just �.fter th� coup; the:ir inquiries were designed to find out Nkrumah 1 s ex-
penditures as well as his corruptions. Th� second source comes from pe.riodica.ls a:id 
other public2 tions such RS th€ vnitcd �etions Statistical Yc3r Book. 
Although I will rely he�vily on th� nrimnry sourc�rn, it is worth noting tbC?.t they 
ma.y �e inaccur;.te and insufficient . Some govC;rnrnents h.ave the tendency of ei th.-:.r 
�eporting false figures to protect the integrity of their r�gime or refusing to 
gi VE:. out certain economic, social or ;::ioli tico.:.l d"tf' if they ft" el th�t the re:velation 
of sach d<-!ta co'Jli be C?.g<inst tnci:::- int:::rcst. One may the refore; find discrep.::nci::s 
in. st.'itistic2.l figurss between those provided by the governmr;;nt concern'·:d and t!121s.:-
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made by other organizati0ns like the Horld Bank 2nd internation&l org•mizat5.ons 
collecting statistical d�t2 in that country. 
I chose to do my research on Jh::ma for many re;;:sons . uhana has been the 1model1 
n�tion in Africa for both Afric<?.n countries and students of 1.frican affairs. The 
grea.test African Ancient King:lom in the 16th c�ntury flourished in Gha!l.s. It is 
believed that commerc� and naticnalistic political cictivities in Afric� began in this 
Empire. 
In the 20th century, Ghand.. continues to be the leading modern nc;.tion in !-.frica. 
It weis tht:: first bl�.ck Africa.n country that �chieved indepcndenc0 from Brita in, 
under Kwami Nkrumoz.h the leader of the Pan African movement. It was �'fKrumah who 
called for independence for :LJ.l of African nations and an cventu�l form�tion of 
4 
the Unit�d States of Africa �nder one gove rnment. Kwami Nkrum�h supported guerrilla 
movements in the Portuguese African territories ;md South Africa in their figbt for 
independence. 
According to European stand:u-ds, at the time of its independence, Ghan� was 
an 1 2dv2nced' country. It hc:.d 2 large rr.idile class of civil servants and a prof:::ssicn 
al class as well as mt.'.rchants. It also h2d the highest standard of �ducation in all 
of Africa south of the SaharG>. and a high literacy ra.te. About 25% of the p'!oplc over 
14 years of �ge are literate .  Approxim•tely 13.3% of the popul�tion is in primary 
5 
school and second2ry school compared to 11.5% in the Congo and 1.4% in �thiopia. 
I �lso chose to do a nation� rather th�n a cross-n�tional study because I 
think that cross-national research in this field is not only too extensive for time 
avail;;ble but.is unneccessary. What see:.!lls to be most important is to test, using 
empirical dat:;., CE:rt�in claims about military instit·J.tions by l:Jestern scholars. 
These cl�ims argue th<t the military is the most mo1ernizing institution in d�velop-
ing areas. Ny re; search will :: tte;.pt to �v.<luat� this claim with reg2r-1 to Ghii..!13.e 
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PROPOSP.LS 
My proposals are based upon certain theories or =. s sumptions ;;.bout milito.i.ry 
government in dr:ve loping are2s m2�e by 1·.7,�ste;rn writers . For the:. sake of clarity 
I shall jividc the propos�ls into two grouns: 1) ��f�nse 1--.Xpenditur�s ar.d 2) 
!:conl>!!lic Deve lopmc:ntal ::->olicit! s. 
Tiefense 1-:Xpenditure 
One of the major reasons why military institutions l!Xist in h.fric2 is to 
protect tbt. n;ction:..l interest and the:: mili ti.ry1 s ov.rn professionalismo In some 
c ·:.:>untrie s whe re the ffiili tary is ind<!:pt:ndent of the civilian gove rnrnent, <S.S was 
the c�se of Sierra Leone before the coup of 1967, military expenditures in the 
nati.·mal budget were very small . The army w._s ill-equipped in terms of uni­
forms and ;1ilit<>ry �quipment. This low militu-y profile. w:::s sustain,.: d by the 
belief among the poli�ical le�d�rs th�t the �rrrry, giv�n more attention •nd 
better st�ndards of living, would become involved in the political �recess in 
th� s�nse of in cre �sing their demands. Therefor� the l��ders tried to keep ths 
army apolitical by keeping t:.x::ienditures small . The military in some countri�s, 
like Ghana during Nkrumah's regime, •re ill-equipped and inferior in como.srison 
to their co'.mterparts in other countries. Therefore< �.fter a inili te:ry tal<c-ov-er 
one could expect a substantial increase in expenditures in defense. 
Zconomic Developme ntal ?olicics 
The economic aspect of modernization ba.s been a m�jor c:rnsc of instability 
in developing ci.reas. The major problem <U'Ca is the ph�nomencn of rising E;X­
pectations. In an effort to mobilize the people against the colonial power, 
the elites of tl'".ESC nati:ms h· d promisc.d. a bcttf..!' stS;nda.rd of livin€;, -:or �11. 
Thty had bl<.:.mcd th� under development of the: no.tion '.)r.. the presence of the colon­
i<;.1 po'f!cr. In m�s t countries thc.se elites wer[ able to ;;.tt<Ain the ind.epsn'.it?r.ce 
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out thdt economic development was not as e•sy �s getting rid of the colonial 
power. '!'hey realised tha.t they covld not fulfill the promises they mrtde to the 
peoplt. This res'llted in frustration within the masses. 'i'he se frustrations 
•re ch.oi.nneled to ;;i.ctiviti�s which tend to erode th<: hgitimacy of the gov�rn­
ment 1 s authority. Th� instability that usually occurs ca.uses the army to intcr­
ven� in the poli ticcil process. tlow�vl':r taking over tbe civilian goverrun�nt 
does not ensure a. re::idy-made legi tini�cy for the mili t:..ry reg�mt. The m:i.lit.s.ry 
regime, like its civilian count�r-part, h's to �cquir� its lt.git�re�cy by insuring 
economic benefits for the peopl� and relative political stdbility. 
Hestern writers of milit-.ry institutions in the devel1)ping a.r�.2s h:t.v� 
theorized that the military gove rnme nts a.re the most �odeI'!'lizing �gent in thtoc 
arc�s. They support such theories by referring to the training abroad of the 
officer corps, the Vestern model of milit2ry organiz-.tion which tbe:ir nations 
�.cquired after independence an:i th!. iemand for efficiency which they s&y is 
natural in �l military institutions. 
If such assumptions bold true one could hypothesize the followiRg on �cono-
mic policies: a) substantial milit�ry inv0lvement in the political process will 
be f ollowod by « relative increase in economic development/infr,-structU!'� 
expenditures, (agricultural, industrial, 2nd tr?de expenditures); b) a sub­
stantial military involvement in the politic�l process will not be followtd by 
an i�cre�se in social expenditurcso 
CHAPTER II 
THE E-vOLUTION O?- !1ILITJ.RY INSTITUTIONS LI.ND ITS H1P_t ST ON THE. ?RDSES3 OF MGDL:PJH6_4'.!:'IO!� 
Scbolrrly liter•ture in this area can be divided into thr�� groups; l)li­
tc;r;.;.ture ti1.;;t dr,f'ls wi tb the history of military institutions in Africa; 2 )li-
tur:-tur!'" tt:;1.t trif.S to ·!'�:;>1:-in why the mili ta.ry inkrvenss into th� political 
..,6-
and social instability of the nations •s the c'usc of the military coup. 
3) Literature th«.t shows the soldii-�r a s  « political .oi.dministrator o Such wri­
tings are usually case studies in which authors try to evalu�te the leadership 
of the military governme nt in ;, p�rticul;r. r country . 
In d.11 three ;;;.reC1s, social scientists h::vc been more preoccupied with 
re�e arch de•ling with the expl�nQtion of the soci�l and economic conditions that 
cause the military to intervene. Therefore the m�jor literaturt on milit�ry 
institutions in 1eveloping �re� s is of this kind . 
There �re three major writers on this topic. All of thes� writ�rs �gr�e 
to what s�ems to be the m3jcr points . The se authors are ?i�rre v�r. den Bergh�, 
James S. Coleman, �nd Belmont Brice Jr. There are, of course, others lik� 
�l<iude E. Welch , Samuel Huntington, Henry Bienen, Morris J;mowi tz who h2ve m;.:.de 
contributions to the study of milit•ry institutions in developing 2reas. 
Van den oerghe in bis article, "The 1'1ilitary and Politice.1 Change in Africa,11 
identifies sev�n types of armies in the e volution of bfrican militdry insti­
tutions. The first one he calls th� Raiding-Citizens Army. Ttis type of army 
is .. found during the statel�ss society in Africa before the coming of Euro­
p�an into the continent. The army itself is mono-ethnic in the sense that it 
is made up of able-bodied men from a single tribe. It is forme::d spontaneously 
when tr.ere is • thre:::it of war from another tribe. Age gr�de determines the 
military divisions to which an individu:�l is assigned. For tbis r�.?Json, c2cb 
division is m2de up of men or boys of the sam� age. 
The secon1 type of ei.r!lly is the Palace Army. Th� deve:lapm::.nt of centr<.:lizt:.d 
m:inr>rcbies dllring the period of the great empires of Ghan<?, Melli �nd ' shc.nti, 
tr<>.nsf.:irmed the R�idi ng Army to the ?;.lace �rmy. During this period S·')mc ki.�1 
uf �rganiz�tion in the ��fairs of the st�te was in its embryonic stoge. The 
F'al,;;c� .D-r':'JY · s the n<.mle literally inplic:s , c".:>nstit'.lte.s the m�jor instru."!lents of 
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powe.:r of the �stablishment--thc king, the nobility ;;nd the clergy cf the offS..citl 
religion. It is :; well organized army and recruitment to it is perm:ment. The:: 
officer c9rpe is madt- up of men of aristocratic familie:s while the ordin:.?.ry 
soldier is of peasant or lower class b�ckground. It is -political -nd is direct­
ly 'J.n:ler the ccntr�l of the king. The m�jor Afric�n tribes tha.t had P<ilace 
Armies w�re the Ful'ini of northern Nigeria , the -�shanti &nd B�nin p eople of 
South�rn Ghana, the Zulu, the Sw&zi -n1 Ndebele tribes of East Afric«. One 
still finds Pal�ce Armies tod�y in areas of Morace�, 1ibya Qnd Ethiopi�. 
The thir:i t;irpe of �rmy is the Futch Army. 'rh.:; introduction of modern t.:tcb­
nology in the me�ns of war and the recruitm�nt of the people of lower class 
st�tus to the officer corps ch�nged the ?<llace Army to the Futch Army. It is 
« v�ry highly professional an:i politicised army. Jue to its power, this type 
of army is quite independent of politi��l officers. Its intcrn-.1 org•nization 
is typifi�d by !nili t�ry dict�torR'.1ip. ·;�r: C:t n fif!,rgb(. cl�ims tbci.. t.'.:;iE- ic t'.- '­
t�.rp< .x:· �rn;y t��et is found in m�y .African countri�s today. 
The fourth is the :r�e.·rrc:nv0lk J�rrny. Thi& typ� of etrmy is typic41..l cf th( 
�ilit2=y institution in.South Africa and Rhodesia. It1s ideology is one of 
white s:iprC'metcy. O:'ficcn ·re tll whites. Non-whites e1!'e recruited as &uxilia.ry 
unarmed �.n1 non-combf.tant troops. In ajji ti on to the regul� military uni ts, 
other units are designed for the sole purpose of intimid2ting the Pfric;n 
population. The army is �political and is under the stern control of the govern­
ment. 
The fifth type of army is the Coloniul Army. This is the type 0f •rmy th�t 
w�s found in th� periods of colonial domination. The purp0se of this army 
was to suppress intern-.J. lfric�n uprisings. The colonitl �owers often ai�ed to 
foster ethnic riv,lry a�ong the trib�s. �cruitment into the •rmy was th�ref�r� 
from illiterate tribes that hc;.vc a strong milit,.ry tr•diti·:m �nd ar� noi:.e:� for 
their ficrcenlss. P.s :;_ mt.&nl! to muimiz� tht: r1.:;li�bility of colonie:.l 8oldicrs, 
-8-
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troops were often stati0ned �way fr0m home among traditional. enemies. The 
c0lonitl army w�s th�refore regarded by the Afric�n with hate 2nd fe�r. 
Due to the high illi ter•.cy r-.te in the ;irmy, the mili t•ry profession is 
still linked with lower status personnel . In tbe eyes of ma.ny it is ;{ symbol 
of past colonial sh.me. Van den Berghe noted that in order for such milit�ry 
institutions to be more effective they would h�ve to ch�nge this im•geo In 
ot.ber words they w�uld h«ve to cre2te a good relationship b�twe!:en themselves 
�nd the rest of the popul�tion. He sugge5ted two ways by which this can be 
done. The first tbing is tc tr-.nsform the •.rmy L'1to what lrn called a li t�r;;.te 
citizcns1army which is to be prop•gandized fully into the n ational ideology. 
lfaking the soldier li ter-.te would remove the reput-.t ion of 11unci vilized and 
savage" which the sold ie r �cquired during the coloniel period, a.nd m&l.king them 
n'tiontlistic would cr.,se the old ima ge of the army as a tool 11f or foreign 
oppreesion.11 Th� second soluti·:m he suggested is to use the arrrzy- in such con-
structive purposes as scinitiltion, re scue crews, tr'"ns:;;ortation and in "Public 
work. Building bridges and roa.ds, and ;i dministering medical aid would be most 
effective in ch:11nging th� image of the African J.i_rmy. However ht"; noted that the 
tr-.nsformation of the Colonial Ar;ny into ;, lfation<?.l P.rmy would not tdke; pl�C(!.. 
overnight. Ind��cd, as 'Jan den Berghe himself ccncluded,110ne should not expect 
7 
The Nation•l Arrrry is the seventh type of �rmy . To �rc.n den Bergh�, this 
is the ideal type. This type of army would be modern but •politicR.l and under 
the control of the civilian governmei:t. V-.:n den Bergh� claimed n'Jne of t..h� /�fri-
can military institutions ha�re reache d this sta ge. Most of the- mili-C.s.ry in-
stitutions today in hfric� not only l�ck � set �f p�litic2l id�ologies, but �rf. 
rel�tiv�ly in:fop�ndent of the powc:r of th<:. pol itic:ol lc-:::der. In .:'c;._ct, the:; po-
litic2l lc-Jer needs thf strong b2cking of thc milit?ry in or��r to stay in 
powc::r and r-c.le r.f:Cecti vcly. The hetc-rogcnous com-oosi ti0n of th� ;i.rmy m<. k.:.s th-:: 
-9-
illsti tut ion ef ths Nation.al Army impossible. N�tion;i.l in this sense me;i.ns that 
e�ch soldi(;r views himself ::<s a "'._)art of tht'! whole nati·)n, rather than in terms 
of tribalism. In th� Gb:A.nai;;i.n army, the officer corps is occupied by the well 
educ:rted south�rn.ers, while the Grdin;r.ry soldie-rs mos tly come from the l�ss 
educ;ted end Muslim Nerth. On� could therefor� exp�ct &n inte nse problem of 
8 
tribalism in the army. 
In 'their article 11The Role of the Military in Sub-Sah�.r �n t:..frica,11 Jif.mf.S 
S. C<i>lem•n and Bel.rnont Brice Jr. try to point out the legacies of the colonial 
rule an the rnili tary est2blishm·"nt of Afric«.. He l ooks �.t the .British, French, 
B�l gian and Portuguese African territories. For my p�per, th� e mpb�sis will 
be OR the British and :french West Afric01n territories.. In West Africe1, Coleman 
:md Brice stated that the British. did not conceutratc on building a str·.mg and 
�ff�ctiv� military establishmcRt. They also noted the imbalance of tribal group 
represent .. tion in the army th�t 'hn den Berghe mentioned . The: British bad a 
poli cy of recruiting the officer corps fr0m the dominent group or tribe. This 
is one of the causes ef the present d�y tribalism of the •rmy in Afric' tod2y. 
The French, on the other hand, view their colonial armies as p • .rt of the French 
army. TherefGre the French did not develop any terri tGria.l -.rmy in the colonies. 
Coleman aRd BricG n0ted th�t these colonie s, even �fter independenco, were very 
depend-ent on their former coloni�l ?ewers for military aid. Hewever they con-
eluded th•t there is a growing tendency �.mong these n<.;.tions to diversify tneir 
9 
dependency to other nd.tions. 
The scccmd p2rt of my literature review d�als with the lite ra ture r)n th� 
ca.us�s ef milite..ry intervention into the politiccil process . In this s ection, I 
will inclt:.:io literature th�t dc;ils with the mili t2.ry as a madernizing agent. 
-�'lfriters :Ln this 2re:et i.nclu':!e Glaude :. He-lcb, M�rtin �. N�cdler, Samuel ?. 
Huntington, Lucien ?ye, Gujr P2ricer, Hartin J. Le;vy, John P. Lovel and I. Eugene 
-10-
Kim, Morris Janowitz, Lerner and Turner. 
Apa.rt from Janowitz, Lerner, and Turner, most of these writars claim th3t 
the military is the only hope for substantial development in the third worlc. 
They use the organizational model of the milite.ry institution as basis for their 
argument in making such claims. They argue that by virtue of the professi�nalism 
of all military institutions and the trai�ing of their officers it should stand 
to reason that the military is the most mo::iernizing agent in these nations . 
In 1960 Lucian Pye claimed that one of the great forces of today is the dynamic 
and self sacrificing military leaders of the developing areas who a.re committed 
to progress and the task of mo::iernizing their societies th2t have been sub-
10 
verted by the corrupt practices of politicians. 
Guy Parker, who has written on the military in South East Asia and spe-
cifically dealing with the problem of combating the spread of Communism into 
th9t area, stated that the politicians in that area would not be able to cope 
with the instability caused by Communist infiltration because they have neithGr 
the prestige of the traditional aristocrats nor the prestige o f  the first 
generation of leaders. lie said th�t those best equipoed to become an effective 
counter�balance to the spread of Communism and instability are the members of 
the national officer corps �s individuals and as nati0nal armies in their or-
ganizational structures. He noted that the soldiers personal qualities of 
lea.de
.
rship, patriotism and cmnmitment to moral values a.re products of modern-
ization and shoulj be the only non-Gormnunist group equipped to modernize tbese 
11 
countries. 
Martin J. Levy stated that the ar:ned forces organization is the most effi-
cient type of organization for the combining of maximum rates of moderniza-
12 
tion with a maximum le:vel of stability and con7.ro;.. 
The major ?oint of John P. Lowel ani I. !.:.ugene ;cim is that the mili tarJr 
:;;;lays an imcortant p-=.rt in the socializatj_on an:i co:rn.mi..mic2tion funct ·:.ons of th� 
-11-
new states, because its own requirement demands that it be rational, univer-
salistic and industrial oriented. Its recruitment of civilian personnel into 
the arrr.y and its contact with the rest of the population, help in the social-
ization of the civilian into mod€rn western society. Because of these reasons 
these a.uthors believe that the mili taI"J is a vehicle for national integration 
13 
and economic and political stability. 
The major theoretical work on military intervention into the political 
process is d':>ne by Lucian Fye, Clcmie �. Welch 2nd Robert D. ?utmano ::.ven 
though they seem to be saying the same thing, I think it i� worth. :revtewing .. �ome 
of their major works. 
Lucian Pye in his work "The Armies in the Process of Political Mc�erniz.a-
tion", claimed that most of the military establishment in developing areas ac-
quired their institutional model from the West. In so doing he said these armies 
have underta�en to create a form of organization typical and peculiar to thz most 
highly industrialized civilization yet knowno In order to achieve the high 
industrial skill .charact.e.ristic::.:Of We�tern ·mi.::ti tary irts·ti t:U:tio�'! j')e said that 
most of the military officers had to be sent abroad for military training. In 
an attempt to compare the soldier with his civilian counter-part in the process 
of modernization, Pye stated that the soldier is more determined to modernize 
the society than the politicians. He gave two reasons for this: 1) due to the 
fact that all military establishments are by nature rival institutions, the sol-
dier is often called upon to compare his standards with other armies of the 
world. On the other hand the politician does not have a s imilar institution to 
compare himself. Because the military uses an international yardstick to measure 
tbe degree of its own development, it is therefore more sensitive to the back-
t ( �. 
wardness of his country and is more commited to nevelop it. 2) �ue to their 
�rofessionalism and training abr�a.d, the milit2i:-y is divorced from the realities 
of their traditional society and is more socialized with the industrial 1'7estern 
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culture . Pye noted that in the developing areas the soldier should not only be 
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a good soldier but a good soldier must also be a modernized man. 
Robert Do Putman • s  work is on the military intervention in Latin Amarican 
countries. Zven though the conditi0ns for military interventian in Latin American 
countries may be somewhat different from those in Africa, I think �is conclu-
sion is worth mentioning in this paper .  Before looking at Futman' s  work, it is 
important to bear in mind that there are great differences between military insti-
tutions in Africa and in Latin America. In talking about these differences, 
Jose Nun, one of the prominent authors of military institutions in Latin America, 
stated that the major difference lies in the fact that there is a greater degree 
of expansion of industrialization in Latin America than in Africa. He also noted 
that the military profession is more respected in Latin America because the armed 
forces are well integrated into the society. This makes the military more insti-
tutionalized in Latin American than their counter-part in Africa. Finally, he 
claimed that military intervention does not threaten the middle class nor is it 
a substitute for its absence but that the military tenjs to represent that clas s .  
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Because of this Nun believes that the military in Latin America inhibits change. 
In Africa the military officers do not represent any traditional l�ndowning 
aristocratic or an urban bourgeoisie. These classes are very weak and even non-
existent. Africanization of the officer corps began after independence in many 
countrie s .  
Mr. Putman investigated five areas in h i s  rssearch: 1) The political de-
velopment of the country; 2 )  Its soci o-economic development; 3) Its military 
establishment; 4) Foreign influence on the military; 5) The military trend and 
influence on the society. He arrived at the following conclusion with regards 
to the probability of military intervention in Latin American politics; a) 
that there is very little evidence linking politicai development to ffiilita�y ab-
stention in politic8; b)  that widespread participation in elections, strong 
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parties and �ressure groups and freedom from political violence are neither necessary 
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nor sufficient for military abstention from politics .  
CH.APTER III 
CAUSZS OF !1ILITJ:.RY IHT3RW.YTION IN POLITIC.S 
The major explanation of military intervention into the political -process 
in Africa is made by Claude E .  Welch . Welch begins his article by identifying 
three types of military inv·olvement into the political process. 
In the immediate post-independence period the army was for the most part 
an advocate of non-involvement. The reason for this is that during this period 
the anny was still under the control of expatriate officers wh0 were �ommitted 
to maintain the government in power .  
The second type of military involvement came in the form of mutinies. The 
aim of these mutinies was not to overthrow the civilian government but rather 
to force the government t o  increase salary scale of soldiers, to institute nen-
sion benefits and to A.fricanize the officer corps .  It i s  worth noting the African-
ization of the officer corps of the army was very slow in the post-independence 
period. For example in 1959 in Ghana, the officer corps was only made up of ten 
percent of the native Ghanaians. The majority of the officer corps were ex-
patriate s .  It must be noted here that Ghana at that time occupied the highest 
level of education in Sub-Saharan Africa. In the Belgian Force Republique 
there were no African officers in 1960. The reason for this late Africani-
zation of the officer corps has been cited as the unavailability of Africans 
with the required education. However, three yesrs later in 1960 in Obana, the 
Africanization of the officer corps increased from ten percent to forty percent. 
This increase was no doubt a result of the intense demand of the African soldiers 
to enter the officer corp s .  
The third type of involvement i s  the coup d ' etat. This type of involvement 
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is directly aimed at replacing politicians and civil servants in the administra­
tion of government . The first coup d 1 etat in Africa was in the Sudan in Novem­
ber of 1958 when General Ibrahim Abboud and some officers took over that 
goverrunent. There has been a succession of coup d 1 etats since that time to the 
present. 
Welch pointed out seven factors that cause the military to intervene into 
the goverrunent. These are: 1) decline in the prestige of the major political 
parties ;  2 )  schism among prominent politicians which weaken the solidarity of 
the broadly based Nationalist movement or party of the colonial period; 3)  the 
likelihood of external intervention in· the event of a military coup; 4) " con­
tagion11 from seizures of control by the military in other African countrie s ;  
S) domestic social antagonisms, most obviously manifested i n  countries where a 
minority group exercised c ontrol e .g .  the Arabs in Tanzania, the Mende in Sierra 
Leone and the Watuse in Burundi; 6) the e conomic instability in the country, 
which in turn leads to the implementation of austerity economic policies ef­
fecting the articulate, urbanized sector of the population such as trade union 
members, the army and civil servants; 7) corruption and inefficiency of govern­
ment and party officials especially during a period of economic decline ; 8) a 
heightened awareness within the army of its power to influence or displace 
political leaders. 
Decline in Party Prestige 
Welch deals with some of these points in detail, one of which is decline in 
party prestige . �elch claimed tbat there i s  usually a s ingle party in the post­
independent Africai countries that is most powerful and respected by all. An 
exa.mple of such a party is the Convention Peoples Party of Ghana and the Sierra 
Leone P€0ples Party. These parties acquired such power and prestige because 
�hey had mobilized the population against their colonial powers and bad suc­
cessf·J.lly won the independence of their countries . The leader of such a party 
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like Kwami Nkrumah of Ghana or Sir Milton Margai of .Sierra Leone are respected 
even to the point of being worshipped. Nkrumah was called by such names as 
Osajifo, the father of the nation, the redeemed and even the messiah by bis 
people. The nation was united as one under this leader. Welch called this 
unity a heterogenous monolith . The leader maintained such a unity by blaming 
the poverty and backwardness of the country on the exploitation of the colonial 
power, and by promising them a better standard of living after independence 
had been achieved. However, after independence the people remained poor, hllngry 
and uneducated. The political leaders have not lived up to their promises of 
a better standard of living for all. S oon there began to appear cracks on this 
heterogenou.s mono-ethic. Primodial attachment became stronger than national 
sentiment. Participation in politics intensified. However such participa-
tion took the form of an obsessive concern with the relation of one ' s  tribe, 
religion or sect to the center of power. Opposition to the leader and his legi-
timacy to govern became intense. At this point the leader or party resorted 
to ways and means to get rid of the opposition and limited freedom of speech·: 
and movement. The opposition in the government is removed in the following 
ways: 1) by creating civil actions against politicians through legal restrictions 
on their activities; 2)  by manipulating the electoral machin�ry against opposi-
tion candidates; 3) by increasing the rewards for ncarpet crossing11 ; 4) by re-
moving the spokesman of the major opposition groups through political house 
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arrest. 
The leader or party continues to rely increasingly on the use of force 
to achieve its goal. As it has always been the case, increasing the use of force 
by the government increases the significance and power of the army. On the 
other hand the power and prestige of the leader or the party continues to de-
cline . In Ghana for example , the use of force by Nkrumah and the Convention 
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People ' s  Party against opposition res:llted in the loss of his power and prestige 
he had at the time of independence. 
Political Schism 
Tbis is uaually a political split among top party officials. Welch pro-
posed that in a state where political rivalry cannot be contained within the 
framework of a single party, the likelihood of a military intervention is increas-
ed. He gave some examples of such occurenc e s .  In Sudan General Ibrahim Abboud 
was invited to take over the goverrunent due t o  a constitutional deadlock in 
the government . In the Congo, the military and General Mobutu took over the 
government when the Prime Minister Patrice Lumumba and President Joseph Kasa-
vubu found themselves in a constitutional impasse . Patrice LUJ'!lumba had ruled 
unconstitutional his dismissal from the position of Prime Minister by the Presi-
dent. In both of these cases the army sees itself a s  the only hope t o  restore 
the country to normalcy. General Soglo, the head of the Dahomean coup d 1 3tat, 
sul1111larized the military rationale for a coup : 
"The trouble witb our country, as you know, is separat­
ism and regionalism with all their threats of divi­
sion. The political leaders are not bad, they are men 
with great qualities who have rendered considerable ser­
vice to their country, but they have proved that they 
ca.."1.not rise above their personal quarrels • • •  Our ob­
j ective is to introctuce into this country a new style 
of politics in ·which the people will rally around a 
program and not around personalities.11 18 
Possibility of ::Xternal Intervention 
Welch _'.,)reposed that a threat of an external intervention t o  stop a co·1p 
d ' etat woulci significantly effect the possibilities of the army intervention 
into the political process. Thera are four conditions that may ca·u&c a pc:rti-
cular foreign country to intervene to s.top a coup. 1) If that nation has a good 
investm:;;nt in that country, the fear that such an inv:; stment might be confis-
c2ste::l by the rr:.ilitary goverru7lent c::>uld cause that country to intervene and try 
to stop the coup d ' etat. 2) If th�t r.ation �as a goo1 number of its ?E OPlE 
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residing in that country, it may intervene if it feels that the new military 
government may cause some oolitical troubles for that population. 3) The cold 
war rivalry may also cause a particular foreign country to intervene and stop ·a 
coup d ' etat if it feels that the new military government may pursue policies 
that would be detrimental or at le2st unfavourable in terms of the cold war 
strategies. 4) The presence of a good number of expatriate military officers 
in the national army may prevent African officers and soldiers from embarking 
on a coup d ' etat . The reason for this is that the expatriate officers are commit-
ed to maintain the African government concerned. The African political leaders 
do realize the importance of expatriates in the officer corps . After indepen-
dence some have tried to maintain a good number of expatriates in their armies . 
During Nkrumah ' s  regime , the highest military officer in Ghana was an expatriate. 
The political leaders have also tried to maintain foreign military personnel 
in the armies by signing military agreements with their former colonial powers. 
Most of the French colonies signed bilateral treaties with France shortly after 
Independence. The agreements of the treaties permit an extensive 11interconnection 
between France and the colonial armies, to a point of allowing France both to 
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intervene directly and to establish bases and military installations ." The 
agreements also provide that the African leaders appeal for French assistance in 
maintaining the organization of their own armies . This means that the African 
leader may call for French military assist8nce to crush down an attempted coup 
d ' etat. In adiition to French declarations to aid the government at a time of 
an attempted coup or political unrest, the treaties provide for a regional mili-
tary organization to co-ordinats military assista�ce and activities among member 
countries. This regional organization is named the Uni�n Africaine et Malgache 
de Defense (U.A.M.�. ) The members of this org�nization which include all former 
Frenca colonies except Juinea, Mali and upper Volta, agreed to come to the defense 
of any member state threatened by a cou? or political unrest. Britain has an 
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agreement with some of its colonial territories. However the agreements are 
exclusively bilateral and do not have a regional military organization like 
the Union Africaine et Malgache de Defense of the �rench colonieso However in 
both agreements, there are provisions for mutual defense, for military equip-
ment and the training of the officer corps. France has a troop of 16,000 
soldi€rs stationed in hfrica, Britain has at the present 2,000 and the United 
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States has between 5,500 and 6,ooo troops stationed in Ethiopia. and L iby e . • 
These treaties that the African leaders make with their former colonial 
powers and other foreign countries are designed mainly to safeguard them from 
military coup. It is worth noting here also that. the signing of these treaties 
give the former colonial power or foreign countri; greater influence in the coun-
try and on the leader as a whole because the extent to which the leader remains in 
power is dependant upon his relationship with the foreign power. If the re-
lationsbip is unfavourable the foreign power may either abondon its commitment 
to protect the leader or it may supµort or even instigate a couD with the col-
laboration of the members of the army. 
Contagion Effects 
This is more like a chain reaction of coups. A successful coup d ' etat 
in one state may cause a chain reaction of c oups into other states .  For exa�ple 
it is believed the coups that occured in Central African Republic, Dahomey, 
T ogo and Upper Volta are manifestations of this Contagion Sffect. The chain 
reaction of coups is made possible by two factors : 1 )  the personal links among 
A£rican military officers in different countries ;  2) an increasing extent of 
inter-African state ties. 
Host of the military officers in today ' s  African army attended the sa.�e 
school. For €Xfu�ple, the scbool where most of the officers from the British 
colonies have been educated in Sandhurst in E�glanQ.. 'l'his is where soldiers from 
Sierra Leone, Nigeria, Ghana, Y.e:nya and Uganda meet an:i become acqucinted id. th 
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the same technique of military organization and ideology. It is believed that 
a successful- coup instigated by one may prompt others to do like�ise in their 
own countryo 
The increasing inter-t.frica.n relations at the United Nations, at the Or-
ganization of African Unity and in other economic and political alliances may 
cause a country to intervene or instigate a c oup d ' etat in a neighboring country. 
Unstable Social Conditions as a Course for Military Intervention 
Such intervention usually occurs �hen a tribe or tribe s '  faction in the 
army see the government as dominated by a single tribe and pursuing policies that 
are hostile to its interest . An exa111ple of this type of intervention is the 
Nigerian coup d ' etat of January 1966. The Ibo tribal group in the army per-
ceived the federal government to be pursuing policies that were antagonistic 
to the Ibo population. This was why the Ibos instigated the coup. The same 
thing happened in Zanzibar where a revolutionary military force overthrew a 
minority government dominated by f.rabs and Shirazis. 
Stagnating Economic Conditi ons 
1·:elch points out that the ex-cravagant expenditures and inefficient manage-
ment in the goverrunent may result into poor economic conditions wbich may invite 
the military to intervene . 
Before proce€ding to the main body,it is important at this point to make 
some general introductory notes on Ghana, its geographical location and economy. 
Ghana is situated on the west coast of Africa, it covers an area of 91, 943 
square miles. Tbis area is just about tbe size of Oregon. It has a population 
of 3 . 4  million. Seventy ?Srcent of these people live in the southern part of 
the country which is much more developed than other areas. The capital of �hana 
is Accra with an 2rea of 618 squrr� mil�s and a population of 337.6 thousand 
pe0ple . 0thEr maj:)r tmms include Sekondi-'I'akordi with 367 tqu�r� :nilc :i and 
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Kum&si with ') 1 1. 0  _, '  .J/ mil�:l:. o 
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Ghana ' s  economy is based on agriculture. ::::ocoa production accounts for 
about 7CJJ., of Ghana ' s  export earnings. However the decline in cocoa price in 
the world market has resulted in a continuous balance of pavment deficit. - " 
Other agricultural products include rice, corn, millet, groundnuts ,  cassava, 
yam and plantain. Mining is carried on extensively with the major minerals of 
diamond and gola and brixite. 
The per capita income in Chana averages 8214 per year. This is one of the 
highest in Sub-Saharan Africa. Ghana has the highest literacy rate in Africa. 
There are three major tribes and over SO different dialects spoken in Ghana. 
The major tribes are the Ashanti, �'we, and Fanti. Ghana ' s  armed forces number 
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17,000 and the National Police Ser-vice has 18,000 men. 
Ghana achieved its independence on March 6, 19$7 from Britain under the 
leadership of Kwami Nkrumah , who became the countey• �  first Prime Minister and 
later President . He reigned from 1957 to 1966 when the military overthrew 
the government . 
CHAPTER IV 
'.\IHY DID THE MILITARY INTERVENE IN GHANA? 
In bis article "Military Officers and Leadership," Robert Price identifies 
two types of motivations for military coup in develo�ing areus . These are 
societal interest and :military professional interest. ·with regards to societal 
interest, Price says that this involves the military intervention into the poli-
tical process to prevent some change in the total society or one of its sub-
systems. Corruption and mismanagement in the civilian government is usually 
motivation for the military to stage a coup d ' etat. The rationale for tt€ coup 
is usually given as to stabilize the e conomy tbrot:.gb the institution of new 
social and economic programs such as land reforms . A cOUJ? d ' etat of urof&ssicnal 
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inter€st is usu.:;.lly staged to protect mili t;ry a.u.tonomy an:l _prerogative . 
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The Ghana coup was staged not only on the grounds of societal and professional 
interest but t o  safeguard individual freedom and liberty. There are three 
reasons why the military intervenes: 1) military professional interest--to 
prevent Kwami Nkrumah ' s  control and manipulation of the military institution; 
2)  to protect individual freedom and liberty; 3 )  societal interest. The military 
intervened to bring back economic stability. It is worth pursuing these reasons 
in detail. 
The Military and Nkrumah 
Africanization of the Ghanaian army took place �rery slowly during the 
colonial period . At the tune of Ghana ' s  independence the Ghanaian army officer 
corps was made up of only 10% Ghanaians, the maj ority was occu.pted by expatriate s .  
This t-ras a very small number for a countr;>r that had the highest standard of 
education in Sub-Saharan .Africa. �vnen l'Ikrumab became Prime Minister, bis first 
goal was to update the Ghanaian arny. The reason for this was encapsulated in 
Nkrumah ' s  political goals. Because Nkrumah was the first black African to have 
successfully won the independence of the first black African country, he saw 
himself and Ghana as the leader and the centre for African political and 
economic spheres. He saw the West as the most exploitive nations in Africa and 
he called for unity of Africa against Western imperialism. He proposed the 
future formation of a United States of Africa after colonialsim ha.d teen driven 
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out of the continent . 
Due to these goals, Nkrumah saw the armed forces of Ghana as a symbol of 
national integration, a. necessary bulwark against a serious threat to inte!'nal 
security and a tangible earnest of his right to military leadership in Africa. 
He increased the army from 4,000 in 1959 to 7,000 between 1960-61. By 1966 
it doubled to 14,000. I n  1960 be established the Ghana Military Academy. 
�he number of African officers increased to over 200 in 1961; by 1966 there were 
as many as 1, 200 African o:ficers in the three branches of the armed forces .  
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To make the military profession attractive he increased the army 1 s  salary and 
fringe benefits. Statistics show that in 1961 a newly commissioned 2nd lieu-
tenant re ceived a salary of $663 per year, a college graduate received $680. 
At the same time the salary of private soldiers was increased to twice that of 
2s 
the national minimum wage . 
There was also an increase in the African officer corps in the navy and 
air force.  Between the time of independence in March 1957 to Auril 1961 the 
African corps increased from 2$ to 150 respectively. 
There was a considerable increase in the government military expenditure . 
Between 1954-55 military expenditure increased from 1.5 percent of the total 
national budget to 5 percent in 1957 and 1960. Between 1962 and 1963 tbe ex-
penditure rose to 7 .5% and in 1965 it increased to 8.4% of the national bud-
get. 
The police force was increased from 6,ooo to 7 ,500 from 1957 to 1961. 
By early 1966 it was 12,500. The number of foreign trained African police 
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officers was forty-seven. 
Nkrumah ' s  Control of the Army 
The tension between the army and Nkrumah began from 1961 through 1963. 
During this period, Ghana ' s  economy was on the verge of disaster. There was 
the problem of rising costs of living because the Ghanaian cocoa production was 
drastically reducei due to the attack of swelling stoot disease on tbe crops . 
Nkrumah exhausted Ghana ' s  foreign rese rve to finance his extravagant development 
projects. There 1rns a lot of discontentment with 
policies. There were strikes all over the country. 
the regime and its economic 
In an effort to curb opposition Nkrumah resorted to control of all spheres 
of governmental as well as private activities throughout J.!lana. . He instituted 
the Preventive Detention Act �o reduce political opposition. T�is act �rovided 
for th& arrest and detention of uers".lns Known to be dangerous to the st.ate . The 
' state ' was Kwami Nkrumah . He later ammended this act to detain political 
prisoners for a period of ten years without trial. ·-:ith the help of �is Con-
vention Peoples Party, Nkrumah took deliberate measures to control the armed 
forces, especially the military. These steps included: 1) the formation of 
a separate military regiment to counterweight the regular military. This regi-
ment was called the Presidents Ovm Guard .Regiment (P.O.G.R. ) .  In 1966 this 
regiment bad 1,142 men and 50 officers. It was made up of about a dozen smaller 
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security units. This becar:ie the legitimate armed for ce of Ghana as far as 
Nkrumah was concerned. He neglected the rest of the armed force s .  The national 
military budget was devoted mainly for the upkeep of this President ' s  Cwn Guard 
Regiment . It was equipped with the besi::. military weapons and was giYen preference 
in terms of military material an::i benefits. Major Ocran, one of the partici-
pants in the coup, described the condition of the army during this period 
vividly: 
"Since the approved type of officers uniform material could 
not be obtained, officers started acquiring and wearing all 
sorts of Khaki drtll frum J apau, Am'"'r icd., Sanadtt, crr1a even 
�he U��H • • •  1� wtts no surprise, therefore, that the morale 
should suffer, and the pride of the regular was hurt • •  by 
1965 the situation had become critical • •  tbe effective admini­
stration of units became impossible and the operational 
efficiency of the armed forces dropped considerably." 28 
The formation of the Fresiient ' s  Own Guard Regiment was opposed very 
strongly by many of the officers. Nkrumah fired Major Ankra from his corru.Tiand 
of the Ghanaian milit�ry force for openly opposing the institution of the Fresi-
dent ' s  Regiment . In an effort to inflitrate the regular army, Nkrumah es-
tablished an intelligence agency called the Armed Force Bureau. In 1964 he 
ordered that the military enlist all personnel in the Conven�ion Peoples Party. 
lie also 1emanded a perio�ic affirmation of the army ' s  fidelity to hi�. 
In 1964 an atte�npt was made to 2saasinate Nkrum2.h by :: member of the police 
f'orce. :s'or this reason Nk::umah d isar!'!1ed �he entire police force, deta ined 
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eight of its most senior officers and transferred the police special branch to 
the President ' s  Own Guard Regiment. 
Between. 1960 and 1963 the fear of a military coup instigated by a Western 
government, especially the United States, caused i�krumah to increasingly rely 
on the Soviet Union and ::ast Zuropean countri�s for military aid. In July-
August of 1961 he made an extensive tour of the USSR, Poland, East Germany, 
Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Yugoslavia and Red China. He entered into rnilitar"J 
agreements with each of these countries. As soon as he  returnej to Jhana, �e 
ordered that 400 cadets from tha Ghanaian army be sent to the Soviet Union for 
of�icer training. This move was objected to by the majority of the o.2'ficer 
corps . One of the officers who objected to this was a British officer in the 
Ghanaian army, General Alexander who was the chief of defence . In a letter to 
the deposed General Akra, '.}eneral l!lexander wrote: 
11The P:-esident proposes to send 400 potential officers to 
the Soviet Union for training. I have done all I can to 
persuade him that such action is neither necessary nor 
prudent • •  It is unwise for several reasons. Firstly, 
it splits the training and outlook of the officer corps 
into two camps, and can breed neither contentment nor 
efficiency. Secondly, I considered that such action may 
in the long-term prove dangerous to the President 
bimself •1129 
Before this time all the �ilitary training of the Ghanai$n officer corps 
had been in Sanhurst, Zngland . 3eginning in 1962 Nkrumah began to recr'.li t 
rtussians as agents to supervise the armed for ces. 
This withering away of the army• s autonomy, �1rofessionalis:n and prero-
gative le� the officer corps and the �olice force to take Jver the government 
while Nkrumah was flying from Rangcon to Peking in Februar-� of 1966, on a 
mission to bring peace in iJi.et Nam. 
',fnen the :nl.J...i. -r,ary t.ook over power one u.f "(.be first things it h?.d to 
do was to u:;1dc.te itself. r:'here ::·:r:=s a gr.:at nt::cd for eqi.'.ipment an::l uniforms., 
3ecd.USB 0f tri.s need, the:-e 1:1as a sutsto.ntici.l increase i!l tne :iera::isc cu .. 1g..;-c 
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during tbe era or the military regirr,e. there was an average annual increase 
of 22% vver !-JKrumah ' s  1966 defense bu\.lget. This was 1.nc.!'easea to 41.4% over the 
1966 budget in l9b8 a.nd 1969. There was also an increase in foreign reld:ti')n 
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Defense 
1966-67 
Nkrumah 
+4.0 
TiBLS I 
l9b7-� 
Mil.1tary Govt. 
+20,0 
"*'-lest Africa, July 27, 1968. p. 868. 
19b8-9 
Average 
22.0 
When asked to explain the increase in the military expenditure Brigadier 
Afrifra replied that the increase was due to "the neglect suf:'ered by our J..rmed 
Forces in the past, it has become imperative to re-equip the e ntire army to 
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justify its existence . "  
My proposal on defence expenditure in this case seems t o  h old true , I 
stated that military involvement in political �rocesses will be followed by 
an increase in defence and foreign expenditures .  
Economic Conditions 
�he second reason for the coup of 1966 comes from the economic cor.ditio.is 
in Ghana at the time of Nkrumah ' s  regime . Nkrumah ' s  e:;oal for Ghana w�s to make 
it a model for Africa in terms of mode::.·nizati::")ll and technology, as well as the 
eentre of the Pan African movement. His economic ")Olicies were therefore geared 
towc.rd the attain."llent of these goals. I n  an Ef .:'ort to compare Nkruman' s econo-
mic ?Olicies to the economic policies of the military government, I will try- to 
pursue the economic condition under the heading of agriculture, �oreign �ra�e, 
injustry and foreign debt • 
.h.griculture 
:'his occu:'.)ies the m:oinstay of the econ::>n;v- in ::lhanfl . S""Gatistics shoF that 
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seventy percent of the population is actively engaged in this sector. It is 
thought to contribute one-half of the gross national p�oduct. Cocoa is the major 
crop grown. In fact Jhana has been characterized as a one-crop economy country. 
�ith concession to fluctuation of cocoa prices in the international market, 
cocoa alone accounts for 65% of the expeirt earnings and it's a major SO'tlI'Ce 
of government revenue and development expenditure . Other c rops include maize, 
millet, rice, groundnuts ,  cass�va, yams and plantain. 
Nkrumah ' s  economic policies were based on his political philosophy. �he 
economy wa::; strongly controlled by the stat e .  This policy was derived from two 
sources ;  first of all Nkrumah saw the Western democratic nations as the most 
exploitive nations in Africa. On the other hand, he saw the Soviet Union as an 
ally for the destruc�ion of Western imperialism in Africa. He was attracted to 
Marx-Lenin theories of capitalism, especially Lenin ' s  theory of imoerialism. 
Because of this attitude toward the West, Nkrumah increasingly relied upon the 
Soviet Union for economic advi0� . Russians supervised many governmental 
agsncies in Ghana. The result of this was a highly centralized economy. Se-
condly, opposition and discontment with Nkrumah ' s  repressive measures was so 
heightened that Nkrumah had to fill governmental positions with his party loyal-
ties. Thus, like the Soviet Union, Nkrumah ' s  Convention Peoples Party bec�'lle 
the state . The members of the Convention Peoples ?arty became the state offi-
cials . 'I'he members of the Convention Peoples Party became the New Class in 
Djilas terminology. Describing this new class, Colonel Afrifra of the Ghana 
National Liberation Council said: 11This new class began to assert itself in 
our society, men to whom concepts like honesty, truth and in�egrity mean 
nothing. This essentially, however, was p�rt of the pseudo-com.�unist system 
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:,Jkrum;ih was building .11 
Nkr1L'llab 1evoted most o� his ef::'orts in the cultivation of cocoa. This 
s�phasis on coc::>a e.s the orJ.y 2.gricultura.l prod:.lCt was the major problerr. of 
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Ghana ' s  econo�y. The revenue from cocoa i s  dependant upon its price in the 
world market. There has been a decline in its price since 1957.  In 1956 
the price fell from $985 a metric ton during that year to a low of $138 a mE;"'.. !'ic 
ton in 1965 . The countrys foreign exchange which stood at $700 million at 
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that time of independence fell t o  $126 million i n  1961. 
�he other major cause of economic proble�s, apart from the emphasis on 
cocoa, was Nkrumah ' s  control of the e conomy, especially the agricultural sector. 
Beginning in 1958 he began to restructure the agricultural as well as the in-
dustrial sectors to facilitate his control. He replaced administrative per-
sonnel in governmental agencies with his party loyalists. In 1959 he replaced 
the Ghana Marketing Board, of the Ministry of Agriculture, with an agency called 
the Ghana Cooperative Council (U.G.F. C . C . ) .  The Shana Marketing Board W2.S 
responsible for buying and selling of government cocoa. I t  was also responsible 
for the i s suing of cooperative licenses to farmers as well as providing machinery, 
fertilizers and insecticides to independent farms and government-owned farms . 
Records of this Board show that it had been efficient in it ' s  responsibility with 
regards to the farmers and the government . 
The responsibility of the Marketing Board was turned over to the U . G . F. C . G .  
The members of this agency were all members of the Convention Peoples Party and 
were very loyal to Nkrumah . This facilitated Nkrumah ' s  control over their a.c-
tivities. The National Liberation Council Com.�ittee on Agriculture found th�t 
all but one of the officers of the U.G.F.C . C .  had the required qualifications. 
Under the U . G . F . C . C .  nearly all inde9endent farrr�rs and cooperatives were put 
under its control. 'rhose tbc.t existed independently had to do so under very 
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dif:'ic;il t con:ii tions. 
By 1961 about 15,000 independent COO?eratives with an ;;sset of over $16 
Million had been brought under the control of the U . G . � . 'J . 'J .  !.�e�otism and 
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corruption was rampant. Inquiring on the mal?r&ctices of the U . G .F . 8 . C . ,  
the National Liberation Council Committee on the purchase of cocoa states: 
"The U.G.F.C .C. brought in paid treasurers ·who were 
illiterate . There was 5Vidence of rigging tbe cocoa 
machines, of delays in wei�hing and in being . absent 
from the buying stations . Eome of �he officers required 
tributes from junior officers when they visited t.he 
agricultural stations. It is believed that senior 
officers of the J . G . � . C . C .  demandej between 150 to 
1100 as a bribe to allow the opening of a cooperative 
society in the villages." 35 
By 1966 it was estimated that of the 1500 coop'=r·-ti ves put under the 
U . G . E' .C . C . • s  control in 1961, only 870 remained with an asset that dropped 
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down from $16 million in 1961 to $2 .5 million in 1966 . 
Another area of mismanagement by the U.G.F.C .G .  was the buying of agri-
cultural machinery from the Soviet Union. Most of this machinery turned 0ut 
to be unsuitable for farming conditions in Ghana. In 1965 the U .G.F.G . C. 
had the following machinery: 919 tractors, 1,087 tillers and cultivators, 
32 combines, 20 corn huskers and 95 tillers. By 1966 it was estimated that 15% 
of this machinery was unserviceable in Ghana because the govern.�ent had not 
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ordered spa!'e parts with the machinery. 
The agricultural firms under the U.G .�. 8.C . were divided into five groups :  
1)  cooperative farms, 2 )  state farms, 3) workers brigade, 4 )  young farmers 
league, 5 )  others in joint ownership with the university of Ghana. ?he U . J . 7 . 8 . � .  
had 1,114,315 acres of land. 
TABLE II 
THE U'i'ILIZATION OF U!L BY STATS AND : ?J.7P."fE F�_RMS-:f 
Types of !ioldings Number Area Area 
Acquired Cleared 
�o�p Farms 870 339,610 23, 705 
State ?arms 123 345,080 90,645 
Workers Brigade 47 280,677 25,490 
Young Frmr . League 37 60,362 1, 999 
Oth€rs 123 88,386 18,238 
•rotal State Farms 1,205 l,llh,315 160;077 
?ec.sant i.i'arms 640.!000 7z937l3J5 
'�3t�tiFti�S 
lo t. �,) 7 
of !i';;.rming a�:i S s rvj_ce Stationso The 
/ :::>,..1 ? 0 0 
Area 
Planted 
18,413 
64,246 
19,140 
1, 950 
10,369 
14,136 
7z937z305 :tebp lblic 
.Acquire:i 
Land "" /0 
5 
19 
7 
3 
12 
10 
o"' Ghana. 
Land 
Planted % 
Oo23 
0.80 
0.24 
0.02 
Oo13 
1042 
98.58 
·, . .:.ccra 
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Even though they bad the largest amount of land and better farming equip-
ment the utilization of the land by the state farms was very small . For example, 
state farms acquired 345, 000 acres of land with an average labour force of 20, 000 
people and good machinery. Rowever �nly 19% of this 12n1 was utilized. The 
total percentage of the land planted \J.SS less than two percent. On the other 
hand, peasants who acquired less land , poor machinery and problems of insecti-
cides and fungicides utilizej more land for planting. In 1965 they produced 
98% of Ghana ' s  food stuff. 
Year 
1965=66 
1966-67 
TJ..B!E III 
RT.rllZNlJ"E OF STATE FJ.Ri.IJS * 
Outside Finance$ 
8,000, 000 
4,ooo,ooo 
1965-67 
Annual Labor Force 
20,800 
13,500 
Revenue$ 
1,400,000 
1,300,000 
*Statistics 
1965) P •  8. 
of Farming and Service Stations. The Republic of Ghana . (Accra 
The reason for this low production and loss of revenue was given by the report 
of the National Liberation Council ' s  Committee on Agriculture: 
"Thousands .of workers were dumped on these farms through 
political pressures. Consequently the number of workers 
employed on �he proJec�s •cs econvmico...LJ..y unrelated to 
the actual returns . In fact as the farms were ai.rectea 
frot1L �he head office, no proper account was Kept or 
expenditures and returns from these farms . Farm managers 
who lacked the managerial· experience and initiative 
required for work were entrusted for obviously political 
reasons ." 38 
Between 1957 and 1959 agricultural production in Ghana increased only 
During this same period Ivory �oast had an increase of 66�. Ghana ' s  
agricultural output ?€r c a�ita increased during the same 9eriod only by 16%. 
39 
Cn tbB other hand, agricultural out�u� in the Ivory �oast increasej 35�. 
?roduction of other crops also decreased in proportion to th8 land utilize�.  
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The only crops that were produced substc:.ntially were cocoa, yarn and cassava 
I 
which are the chief staple foods in �hana . I t  is worth noting here also that 
the great€st producers of this food stuffs were indepenjent ccoperativcs and 
peasant farmers .  Production of crops was as follows: 
1964 
Crop 
Maise 
Corn 
Millet 
Rice 
Groundnuts 
Cassava 
Cocoyarn 
1966 
Naise 
Corn 
Nillet 
Rice 
Groundnuts 
Cassava 
Cocoyam 
"*Economic Survey, 
Industry 
TAB!E IV 
1'"00D CROP PRODUCTION* 
1964-66 
Area Planted 
(1000 acres ) 
soo 
411 
255 
105 
159 
402 
603 
602 
434 
333 
65 
80 
364 
431 
Ghana (Accra, 1969) p.4. 
Production in 1,000 
Metric Tons 
170 
434 
42 
301 
�c3 _,..I 
107 
66 
29 
20 
1152 
1170 
Nkru111a.h turned to industrialization when he found that his agricultu:. .. :?.l 
policies were a failure o The industries included a major production industrf, 
Fibre Bag Manufacturing Industry, vegetable and oil industries and textile mills 
industries. In 1966 these industries were producing less than 50% of their 
capacities. Therefore a good number of these industries were operating at a 
tremendous loss. The ��jor c�uses of this were lack of effect�ve Dlanning, 
bureaucratic inefficiency and malpractices. In its inquiry on gover�ment 
ind�strial activitie s ,  the Nat�onal Liberati�n Council So!IL�ittee on Agri-
r.:ultilr� Toe.de the f0llm-ring conclusion: "The successful operation of these. in-
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dustries was hindered by lack of qualified tEc�nicians, competent managers, 
nepotism, over-staffing and inadequate supply of raw materials coupled with 
inavailability of foreign exchange for the importation of other items needed 
4o 
in the production and manufacturing process .11 
Some of the factories were established where no nrovisions had been made 
for the availability of the raw material required to run tb�m. One reason for 
this was the desire of the regime to satisfy certain political interest deman1s . 
Consequently the supply of raw materials was of secondary importance. In other 
cases poor feasibility studies for the execution of the projects and lack of 
effective coordination at the planning stage among the various agencies con�erned 
with the e stablishment of the enterprise contributed to the inefficiency of the 
41 
industries. 
Eighty-five percent of Ghana ' s  manufacturing was in the agro-industrial 
area. Nkrumah constructed the Volta Hydro-�lectric Dam for the processing of 
Brixite. The cost of this dom was $196 million. The utilization of this da.� 
in the food processing industry was under 25% and its utilization for the entire 
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manufacturing business was under 50%. 
By 1965 Ghana ' s  foreign exchange was completely exhausted .  In order to 
finance many of bis economic projects Nkrumah turned to East I;uropean countries 
and to some countries in the west for loans. The major part of Nkru.i�ah 1 s  loans 
were through wba.t is called ' suppliers credits ' .  The term 1 suppliers credit1 
relates to a particular form of financing eq1.:.ipment and material imports . "I'he 
sup9lier does not necessarily provide the loan directly, this usually comes from 
2 separate financing institution, but arranged by the SU?!)lier. This loan is 
made, an1 payable, in foreign exchange . Supr:;lier credits may be regarded as a 
short-tern loan. They arc= payable before the project for wbich they have been 
ne5otiat:d :-;E.n be eXD6Ct".;d -r,o ge!1erai:.e incoms to allow re"9ayment on a self li-
qui1atin; :asi s . Sa??liers cre1it are short-term -not on a financial but on 
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an e conomic criterion. 
Nkrumah · obtained supplir;r credit from both the 11iest and East Eurouean 
c ountrie s .  In terms of interest on the supplier credit loans, the v·est i:.uro-
pean countries had inte rest rates of 5-6% with a principle payable in 5 to 8 
years. Loans from East Eurooean countries had interest rates of 2-3% on a . 44 
principle payable in 12 years. The low interest from East �uropean countri�s 
was due to the very close relationship which Nkrumah had 1e'Jelope1 with these 
countries . 
Ghana ' s  foreign exchange liabilities with regards to supplier credit loans 
i s  as follows : 
TABIE V 
FOREIGN LXCHANGZ LIABIIJTIES* 
Note: n.c.•lfow Cidi, approximately One Dollar 
End of Year Total Liabilities Liability of 
1963 38, 372 n . c .  
1964 346,786 n.c. 
1965 386,363 n.c. 
1966 375,457 n.c.  
*Ghana Economic Survey, The 
Suppliers Credit 
Central 
286, 276 n.c. 
301,010 n.c. 
283,583 n . c .  
Bureau of Statistics 
% of Total 
82.4 
82.4 
79.5 
71.9 
(Accra, 1969). 
By 1966 Ghana ' s  debt service had risen to 50% of its export earnings . 
I t  is estimated that Nkruma'b signed sixty-nine financial agreements with .foreign 
agencie s .  Of these sixty-nine, forty-seven were made with Western firms, 
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eight w'Lth the Soviet Uni on anj fourteen with 3ast European countries. Sy 
1965, be cause of worsening economic con1itions,many Western fina.ncial insti-
tutions refused to accE:pt financial agreements with Nkrumah ' s  regim€ . 'i'he 
government was even unable to pay for imports, freight insurance and dividends on 
for€ign investm�nts. Due to this there was a continuous delay in the shipment 
of e:quipment . The estimate of ��krumah 1 s debt has v?.ried widely. However in 1966 
it s��ms to have rsached 20 million j �llars. This debt included a medium-term debt 
-33-
at an interest of 60% in five ye�rs and 71.7% on e long-term d�bt with a� interest 
of 5% in 19 year�. Three -fourths of this debt is accounted for by suppliers creditors 
in the United King:iom. Fi vc bundrE:d thousand :iollars was owed to financial 
agencies in the Unit(;;d States and. $150,000 was owed to financial agencies in the 
46 
Soviet U�ion. 
Ghana had a substanti al trade relation with the Soviet union an1 East 
European countrie s .  In 1965 Ghana ' s  ex?orts t o  the 8omm�nist block re£ch�d 
35%. Foreign inve stment was very small because of the fear that ��kru."!'12.h i11ight 
nationalize the industriea. Britain was tht:. major •.re st ::..:uro-oean c ountry that had 
a substantial inve stment in Ghana . The others were owned by lfr:cans from other 
countries,. 
Ghana 1 s  foreign reserve had dropped down from th� $7)0 million it ��d in-
herited from the British administration at independence to $300 million. There 
was an unfavourable balance of ?ayments due to the high rate of govern.m�nt ex-
pen1iture on capital equipment which was unoroductive . The cost of imoorted 
goods was very high, this was due to the government ' s  deliberate policy of tbe 
allowing of im�orts of consumer goods to counteract nrice raises on internal 
ma.rket s .  The im�lort restricti ons instituted by Nkrumah were not only erratic 
47 
but subject to removal by negotiation. 
There were strikt:s all ove.r ::Iha!'la. :Oy the time the- military took over tbs 
govern.ment , there was 2 great shortag� o� :J.hane 1 s staple .t' 
-
.i. 001S • This was mainly 
due to strikes that exten�cd to the agricultur8l depart�ent . 0ue to thess st�:kes 
in this department, most of the fermers wer� not SUjDlied with the necessary 
SO'- els and fert�_lizers. 
!!�litary in Political Le � d crshi� 
_ :E. "":f j Jr .;oal 'Jt: th� n5.litary regime was to stabilize Ghana ' s ..:.c'.1no:·ay. 
to ::lo th ts ·0h�y nr:.cdcd .:.'i ne.ncial ai-:1 ·::;:-
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fication with regards to obtaining aid from abroad. They acquircj aici from bo0h 
3ast and �'Jest. Howeve:r, the. fear of a Soviet Union sponsored counter-coup in 
1967 led the militc.ry gcverni01ent to te;r11inatt th�ir rcl c:tionship with the: 3oviet 
Union, .Cuba and scme "Sast �uro:_)ean countri e s .  In 1967 ove:r one-th')u.send ::i.us :;i�ns, 
Chim·s� and !'.�a.st Europe: an technicians in Ghana -w�re: prompt.ly expelled .  This 
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nu.11b�r included 665 :::tussi2ns, S2 Chines� technicic:ns . The polici�s of th� 
military govern.rnent w�rt? th�refor� pro-:,restern. :'bcse pro-1 -e st:.;rn p')lici.es in-
curr�d ce .rtain advantages to the military regim� with regar·:ls to eJ�t�rnal assis-
tance . Many countries in the ·v;est that had been antagonized by Nkru.'!lah 1 s brand 
of ?an-Africanism and anti -colonial sentiments were quick to r�spond to the needs 
of Ghana during the military regime .• 
In 1966, the military government asked the International Monetary ?und 
to study the economic condition of Ghana. Other nations volunteered to be 
members of the gro-.1p that was formed by the IMF. These countri�s uere Canada, 
Frei.nee , West Crermany, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Switzerland , the United 
49 
Kindgom and the United St�tes. At the end of these studi�s the H7 rr.ade �n 
agreement with the military officers whereby Ghana was allowed to draw $36,400,000 
5C 
in various currencies within a twelve month period .. 
To help relieve food shortage in Ghana the rdli ta!'y govt:rnment mc;d� c:gree-
ments with the Unit�d Stat�s �nd othr:r c0untries for the supply of food. In 
late 1966 the U . S o  supplied 2, )00, 900 pounds of rice, maize, flour, vegetable 
oil, tobacco, and cotton through �he � .L. 480 �rogram. 7hc 82nadia.1 gover.i.m�nt 
supplied 17 , 500 tons of flour �d the Uni t�j !Cing:iom off�red a.11 €.Z_port c-redi t 
guarant(.:'.� of $600,000 5.n low pc.yments for :rh ana ' s ir.nediate im:,:iortation of the 
51 
commodities from the Unit�d �tates and �2nada. 
?ht. :.: .;, • also sbow:;d its s.-;;proval of th� �i:'..� tary ?ro--. ·cst�rn oolicies 
·oy inc:.�e a.sin5 i .:.;s f:i.n::..nc:al a ssist?nce to Ghana. Dur·in5 l�kru."'nah' s regime the 
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the United Statc:s :lid not give any aid t·o Ghana . How�vcr, during th� military 
regime, the · U .s. gava a:bout $75 million in aid, $13 .2 million in grants and 
$61.8 million in loans. · Since 1966, the U . S .  provided training for 41 d·hanaian 
52 
military officers and 25 police officers here in the U . 3 .  I t  is estimated 
tbat under the military, Ghana r eceived a·oout tw0-thirds of United States aid 
to Africa. Other cou.ntrie;s which provided financial assistance to Gh ana were 
Canada, Japan, and Australia. The total amount. of aid from th.:.se countries was 
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2 . 5  million dollars . 
'rhe second policy of th� military regime was to reduce governmental C):-
penditures .  It sold some of the state farms to individual enterprises �nd 
decentralized the rest to local agencies who carried the financial burden of 
their operations. There were a total of 125 state farms at th� time of tb<:: coup . 
'i'he National Liberation -Council (NLC) ass igned . the state farms to the following 
organi zations: 1)  the oil palm cooperation was given 4 oil projects; 2 )  the 
fibre corporation took over the production and processing of 10 fibre projects; 
3) the rubber corporation was given nine rubber projects; 4) the extention ser-
vice of the ministry of agriculture took over the management of three rice pro-
jects. In addition, 78 farms projects were sold to independent farmers and the 
ministry of agriculture was given the authority to reallocate 37 fc.rm projects 
for the use of extention bases, seed multiplication centres, shortag� de?Ots and 
54 
workshops for agricultural institutes .  
r he farmers whose land was confiscated b;>r Hkrumah for his stat� farm pro-
jects were given 20 farm projects as c ompensation. The rest of the state rubber 
farms were turned over to the Fireston� Cornoration which made a.n agreement with . 
55 
the mili to.ry g�vernment to manufacture tires in Ghana .  
J:'...r-:;ct governmental agricultural and e conomic activitits were limited only 
to '2ntc"'Dris .. s t.hat ha.d a substantial operation2l adv2nt2.ge;; over peasant :farmers . 
1\-,� c·J·.:.:. v.:: "i: i:-n o: cott,on an::l. sug�r was intensiried t o  supply the raw ma.t·::rial 
-36-
were not in op�ration in 1966. To facilitate more production and at the s ame 
time reduce. the cost of production, factories were relocated to areas ;..>here the 
raw material was available . I:;xperienced technical as well as a:iministrative 
personnel were provided by the Jnite1 Nations to help design and supervise th� 
projects. The number of farm workers w�s drastically cut d0v.1Il. The r� sult of 
56 
these policies was an increase in the revenue from the state farrns. 
Year Outside Finance 
1967 -68 2,600,000 n.c. 
1968-69 1, 800, 000 n . c .  
1969-70 700 000 n.c. 
-� .i:,conomic Survey. · _{epublic 
1969 and 1970). 
TABIB VI 
filW.J.:NUE OF STATE FARMS * 
1967-70 
A nnual Labour Force 
9,000 
S, 300 
4 650 
Revenue 
1,850,000 
2,800, 000 
1 850 000 
of Ghana, Central dureau of Statistics Accra 
The production of most of �hana • s  principle food crop during the military 
regime incre!'lsed over the production during Nkrumah 1 s regime . This was partljr 
due to the full utilization of the land and good planning and efficient man&ge-
ment . 
1968 Crop . 
Maize 
Sorn 
Millet 
t: . 
_ .. l.C!: 
Groun:3nuts 
1969 �rop 
:'�aizt: 
Corn 
:�illet 
?..ic!� 
G-rounjr.uts 
TABIE VII 
LAN� UTILIZATION * 
1968-69 
Area ?lant�d in 1 000 Acres Production in 1000 metric tens 
517 
298 
271 
88 
680 
3S9 
400 
100 
400 
Aid 2equirement. 
253 
72 
57 
42 
300 
96 
90 
60 
1350 
Jan-June 1969; rlepublic of Ghana (1070) 
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Due to the conditions of decline of cocoa pricls in the world market, the 
military regime made efforts to diversify Ghana ' s  agricultural production. 
These efforts to diversify included encouraging the grovrth of such crops a s  
oil palm, sugar cane, cotton and rubber .  I t  also extended its agricultural acti-
vities by creating �ducational centres for the training of youths in .:t·arming 
pr.actic e: s .  I n  1968 the gov�rnm�nt embarked o n  a t'eeders Reads Devt..lopment 
Program .  The main obj�cti"ltt of this ;:-rogra:r, wa.z to improve the move:i!ent of pro-
d�ce from the ��ral centres to th� tovra. In order to minimize fluctuation in 
farmers ' incomes ,  farmers were guaranteed minimu.m prices for rice and waize at 
v.:hich price th� food raarketing corporation would purchase any quantities of these 
products. The increase in guaranteed minimum prices was frorr. $6 .20 to $7 .50 
for rice and from $4.50 to $7.00 for mai ze . The price of cocoa was increased 
57 
to 14% in producers prices. 
The government 1 s industrial policy with regards to private sectors was 
to encourage Ghanaian control of certain parts of the economy. During Nkrumah ' s  
regime, major parts of tbe business i n  the private sectors were 0�-ned by ex-
!)atriates . The reason for this was the fact that only expatriates co·_t.ld afford 
to pay the bribes for licenses to governmental officers needed to open up a bus-
58 
iness in Ghana. 
The nations that had business interests in Ghana during 1;krumah 1 s period 
were> Britain, Lebanese and Syrian merchants ,  Italians, Je�ans, French a:id e. V';!ry 
high numb�r of Africans from neighbouring countries. :n 1962 2-J.ropeans owned 
more than 5,000 of the country ' s  103,000 industrial establishments while Africans 
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from neighbouring countries owned 3,000 iniustries. B�caus� of foreign domi-
nance in the industrial sector of Ghana ' s  economy, th� mil�tary government em-
bfir!<ej on � �::ri!!S of measures in 1968 to !'educ� s uch domirnrnce an'.3 to allow 
}i1Cl.t:.siai1s t0 ?lay a major p2:-:-t in the ovme rs::i::i o-:: petty busin6sses and in-
-38 
In December of 1968 it introduced a decree which �rohibited foreign ovm�r-
ship of firms and industries with an annual gross national retail sales of under 
$490, 000; wholesale firms of $980, 000 or ltss; industries and firms having 
fewer than 30 employees; and firms and industriEs in extractive, proces sing, 
60 
manufacturing or transportation busin�sses with a capital of $98,000 or less. 
In November of 1969 the goverP.ment instituted the Re sidence ?crmit Com-
pliance Order .  This order was to rc:;strict other A fricans, Lebanese and Syrian 
61 
merchants from petty businesseso In the same year the government introduced 
the Ghanaian Business ?remotion Act. This act orovi::led :or government assi st.3nce: 
in the promotion of Ghanaian business enterprises . Th� act also charge1 for��ign 
business enterprises to maintain programs to train Jha.naians to a cquire the 
sKills neces sary for the op�rati0n of businesses . �he act further listed busi-
ness enterprises that woul1 be r� served exclusiv�ly for Ghanaian ownership. 
These included overseas businesses operating in Ghana, commercial transportation 
by lanj , bakeries, printing, beauty shops, commodity brokerages, advertising 
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and publicity an1 manufacturing of cement blocks. 
These decrees were mainly aimed at other Africans, Lebanese and Syrian 
businessmen. The result of these decrees was the confis�ation of some 600 firms 
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by the 6overnment. The majority of these firms were own�d by A!ricans from 
neighbo-..iring v-;�st African countries. This act of the military g;overnment was 
O?posed by Sierra L�one, and Nigeria. In Sierra Leone, the government r� act�d 
to this act by expelling all Ghanaian fishermt·n doing busine es in �r.� etmm. 
·.-kstern European fir'1s were not v�ry much a f±'ec�ed by these 1ecrees. In fact 
th� �overnment introduced the �apital In1estment tct to induce 1uron�an inve st-o . 
r;.ents in J.bana . -::'h e s e  ind.ucements included guar2nte·ed transfer of profits, 
l.· ,.. -'- e r �+ �n,.:i "' ri nci.· ,....1 ,. i· n com�, t'"'""' holi." d a\r -� n� "'- �� !"_ ._,.,, t,_· on �rorn +. ar'i _.:-_f' ::in � duti· !'>::>. .  l. I,; ,,_; ... v e.. •• � � • !:" - ' • • ...: (A.{. ' c � '  --- - - - - '-< • -
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ment was good. In the industrial area, there was an increas� in private busi-
ness and a drop in government-owned bu.sinesse.:: . There was c;.n increase in govern-
ment revenue from the industrial activities of foreign companies. 
1966 Nkrumah Industries 
Total 
State-OVmed 
Joint-State-Owned 
Co-operatives 
Private 
1968 Military Industries 
Total 
State-Owned 
Joint-State-Owned 
Co-operative s 
Private 
TP.BLE 7III 
1966-68 
Uumter of 2stabli shme�ts 
267 
74 
7 
3 
183 
383 
68 
12 
1 
302 
* Statistical Year Book, The ?-ebupli_c of Ghana, 1967-68. 
Rev�nue 
142,lLJ n.c. 
31, )57 n.c. 
11, 266 n.c. 
88 n.c. 
99, 232 n.c. 
176,656 n. c. 
43, 61) n.c.  
20, 599 n.c.  
16 n.c.  
112,440 n . c .  
(Accra, 1970)p. 86. 
Revenue from export agricultural commodities was also incr6ased due to the in-
crease in production. 
Nkrumah 1965 
Nkrumah 1966 
Military 1968 
I-iili tary 1969 
TABLE IX 
EXPORT EAPJ.{DIGS * 
1965-69 
Ex9ort Earnings 
226, 882 Il o C o  
191,393 n.c. 
2L . .5,122 n.c .  
338 782 n.c. 
* Statistical Year Book, Th� Republic of Ghana, 0 A�cra, 1970 p. 2030 
'rhe value of exports as a whole was incre asl'!d by 12�; .  Th� balance of trade 
from a deficit in 1966 to an estimatbd surplus of over $30 million in 1968. 
ihe total governm::nt re-ceipt in 1969 including committed ai3 minus payments was 
�d·fin ";"11i.2.lion. This was an incre9.se of 13 .5J�, from the 1968 level. 3ec2use 
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of the high price of cocoa in the wo�ld mark�t 1�ring the military �egime, 
re:.ceipts from cocoa were 0250.4 million. 'rhis was an incre a se of' 19 .1%. 
In 1967 the military dev&lucd the Gha�aien currency to thirty percent. 
This devaluation h�lped to redre ss some imbalance in external payment s . Thtre 
was a ste�p rise in cocoa prices in 1967-68. The increase in the c ocoa Drice 
helped to offset the value of Ghana ' s  exports. 
In March of 1968 the militar-.r regime introduced the international two­
tier gold pric�s. This effort improved Ghana ' s earnings from the sales of gold 
bullion. By the time the military relinquished power to civilian rule in 1969, 
Ghana 1 s balance of payment stood at 5687. 2 million. This was consi :lered a verJ 
favourable balance of payment. 
Therefore with reg�rds to the economic conditions in Ghana, my proposal 
which states that 1 1a substantial military involvement in the political process 
will be followed by in<!rease in e conomic development" seems to hold true . 
My research tende to show that the reilitary regime substantially imnrov�d the 
economic conditions in Ghana. 
Human Resources: �ducation 
My research indicated that more schools were c0nstructed during the mili­
tary regime than during the civilian gove rnment of Nkrumah . There were more 
students enrolled in school �l:.iring the :\krumah period than in th.! mili tery 
regime . In 1965, 75% of the ?rimary ag� c�ildren were 1.n school. The high 
enrolb1ent during this period wvs �uc to the fr�I'! e duce.ti':m which �Tkrt�Tilah in-
stituted in 1961. 
iiowGver in 1966 'iue t'J the economic -problem, the military h:.:id t o  abolish 
fre� �chools tcr:r�0:'.'arily o :Che charf;5 for text bo o!<:s -..Jas ) 3 .  00 for ?rima!'y ai;j 
."'!:..dl:lc sc�Jools a:l:i �;10. 00 �or s�cond 8r:' schools . This acti ''n csused 2 r'.:c1uc-
:,:.0n o: s":,u-:'·�nt;:. ·::ii·o::!..J.m�nt in scbool to 40;.. . :-Iowevcr, �ht- overall e }�p�n:li t.u.r�s 
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T.\:3IB X 
NUMBER AND T l'PE OF t;D:rcATIJi,lfL :C� STIT13TI0Hs-� .. 
Type of School :�rumah 1964-65 196$=66 
Total number of schools 10, 3 25 l0,561 
Frimar.r schools 7 ,  900 7, 961 
Hi::l::ile schools 2,112 2 , 267 
Secondary schools 136 150 
Technic:al schools l�4 45 
Tec:.chers 1 'I're.ining Colleges . h8 83 
Higher educational institutions 3 3 
Type of School Military 1966-67 1967 -60 
Total Numb�r of schools l0,660 10, 946  
Primary schools 7 , 913 7,480 
Middle schools 2 , 365 3 , 036 
Second&ry sch ools 163 167 
Technical schools 61 63 
T�achers' Training Coll�ges 83 82 
Higher educational institutions 3 3 
-lf- Statistical Y�ar Book, The ::tepublic of Gh-sna, 1967 -68 (.Accrc;., 1970) p .  191. 
TP.BIE XI 
T- e of 3chool 
. 4 dministration 
?riffiary" school 
Secondary school 
Colleges and Univ�rsiti�s 
T�chnical Training Sc'.·:.ools 
A:iul t ed.,  libraries, museu.'lls 
Total------------------------
Type of School 
Administration 
Primary school 
Secondary school 
Colleges and Universities 
Technical Training Schools 
�1ult cd. ,libr.;rics, musem:ns 
Others 
Total--------------------�-
",� Stci.tistical Year Book, Tbe Republic 
l>Tkrumah 1965 
3 , 2  o. n . c  • 
23,921.5 n . c .  
7 , 902. 9  n.c. 
28,261 . 8  n.c. 
1,393. 0  n . c .  
1, 082.3 n . q .  
66,003 . 0  n . c .  
Hilitary 1966=67 
2 ,551 .7 n.c.  
27,143.3 n . c .  
8,567 . 3  n . c .  
26,924.2 n . c .  
1,864.4 n . c .  
1,866 . 9  n . c .  
212 .s n . c .  
68 460.l n . c .  
"Jf }hana, 19 ::.cc!' a ,  
Nkrumah 1966 
1,0 1.3  n . c .  
11,867.4 n . c .  
3 , 893. 4  n.c.  
13,616.4 n . c .  
2 , 006.0 n.c. 
376.1 n . c .  
33,491.8 n.c. 
Military 1967-69 
2,481.4 n.c. 
2 7 , 223.4 n.c. 
io,;77.L n . c .  
28,240.7 n . c .  
1, 814.;)  n .. c .  
1,318.6 n . c .  
611.0 n . c o  
172 066. 9  n.c. 
1970 -o .  70-71. 
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TABLE Y..II 
NUMBER C? ME:DICAL ??250NNEL * 
Nkrumah 1965 1966 Military 1967 1968 
Government Hospitals 125 127 129 129 
Doctors 576 573 497 539 
Dentists 35 39 35 37 
Nurses 2,660 3,078 3,173 5,095 
Midwives 1,601 1,894 1, 981 2 ,  3.34. 
Medical Field' Units 217 224 224 139 
Qualified Pharmacists 355 342 357 357 
5� Statistical Yec.r Book, The Republic of Ghana, 1967=68 (Accra, 1970) p .  193. 
The medical personnel and i terns tabulated above arc all employed 5.n govern-
ment agencies. There were other medical h ospitals that b�longed to foreign 
mining companies and Christian missionari� s .  These hospitals and their per-
sonnel are not included in this t a9le. 
As the figures show tbe military government instituted more medical faci-
lities in Ghana than during Nkrumah.' s period. There were c ontinuous shortages 
of medical supplies due t o  uneven distribution during 1-Jkrumah 1 s regime . The 
largest amount of medical supplies and facilities were heavily concentrated in 
the urban areas, the rura.l or villages be-nefitted very little from the medical 
improvement. 
To solve this problem, the military government introduced medical mobile 
unit centres .  Apart from distributing medicine t o  villages, these mobile 
uni ts were also used· in health education helping villages become aware of 
modern medicin� . 
TABIE XIII 
GOVERNMENT K�DIC.:\L EX?:-�'DITURE �!-
(per thous2nd cidi 
Item Nkrumah 19 19 Mill. tary 19 o-7 
Administration 4,449.2 n . c .  2,416.9 n . c .  4,516.5 n.c. 
!tese.:::.rch 4.1 n . c o  59.5  n . c .  1+42 .. 2 n . c .  
�osvitals 13,81S.2 n.c. 4,125.9 n . c .  10,284.2 n . c .  
lfedicc.l ani Dental L..72 . 6  n.c. 178. 9 n.c .  168.1.n.c .  
Special E�a.lth 3e rvice s  918 .9 n . c .  693 . 8  n . c .  1,089 .2 n . c .  
Total------------------19 660.0 n. c .  7 475.2 n . c .  16 565.5 n.c. 
':- '.::.atis-Cic:::. l �55.r Zook, The �c;_:mblic o f  Jhana, 19o7-· u o  .kcra, 1970 p .  
19 7-9 
4,839.3 
145 . 8  
15,201 . 9  
54.7 
1,213.9 
21 455.6 
19 • 
n . c .  
n . c .  
n . c .  
n.c.  
n . c ,  
n . c .  
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'l'.P.BLE XIV 
T e of Welfare Nkrumah l9b> l9bb Military l9b7 l9b7-69 
Social Security , 31.3 n.c.  3 ,  ';/ . 7  n.c. , 21.9 n . c .  22,7  1.1 n . c .  
War Veterans 264 .9 n . c .  55.8  n. c . 131.8 n.c . 116 .l n. c .  
Child Care 31.0 n.c.  8.5  n.c . 14.4 n.c . 46.9 n . c .  
Care of Aged,Disabled 100.0 n.c. 36.6 n . c .  86.1 n.c. 92.6 n . c .  
Housing L.,649 .. 2 n.c.  639.7 n . c .  2 , 77 2 .6 n . c .  7 , 150.'/ n . c .  
Other Welfare 332.9 n.c.  29.8 n.c .  221.6 n .c . 19L. . l  n.c . 
Total 101810. 2  n.c. 4.2239.1 n . c .  112650 .6 n.c. 231410.1 n . c .  
* Statistical Year Book, The Republic of Ghana, 1967=68. (Ac cra, 1970) P •  134 .. 
CHAPTER V 
CONCWSION 
This study show�d that the military has proved itself !!lore useful in terms 
of providing economic benefits, better health aid and education for th� people 
·' 
of Gbana than the civilian government of Kwami Nkruma.h . The reason for this 
success was their pro-Western policies. These policies attracted foreign busi-
ness as well as aid to Ghana . On the other hand Nkrumah 1 s anti-··�est and anti-
colonial attitude caused many Western countries to withdraw most business and 
aid programs from Ghana . This meant that NkrUinah had to ?Ursuc his e c0nomic 
development progra�s �ith the scarce resources of Ghana and the little aid it 
got from the Communist block. 
It is not ass�ed here that a pro-:�estern policy i s  the best policy, for a 
military regime or even a civilian gove ::-nment. -�[hat one may suggest is thc.t :i..n 
the case of Ghana, the ·':'ro-'!'·lcstern policie s of the military government contri-
buted hea.vily to the degree of economic rec·:r.rery during the! militaX"J regime . On 
the other hand, it is worth noting here the:. t th� anti-��-estern ?Olicies of Ghana. 
during >ikrumah ' s  regimL not only r�duced th� amount of aij co�ing to �hanc. but 
imo(;�ded :ore ign investments in Ghana espe ci�lly fr0m countries of th..:· West. 
1,ltbcugh 0nt c.s nnot Mak:=; an ace.:ie!nic citation bere:, a foreign � tud�nt from Jhana, 
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John Okipi informed this researcbe � that the c,r.A. was involved in �he over-
throw of Nkrumah. 
'i'he pro-Western policies of the military government provided the financh�l 
aid the military needed for its programs . And also as the table on foreign 
investment shows there was an increase in foreign investment in Ghana. It 
is true that there was exploitation and black-mailing by foreign companies .  
What seemed to be important however, was the military regime needed the financial 
aid necessary to implement some of their programs. 
There was good reason for the army government to ";)Ur sue a pro-l·!ester:i policy. 
Nkrumah ' s  relations with the Soviet Union and �ommuni st countries were very 
strong. There were advisors from the Soviet Union in almost all govern.'Tlental 
agencies in Ghana during Nkrumah ' s  -.regime . _!\fter tbe coup the fe2r of a counter-
coup instigated by the Soviet Union, caused the military to deport a good num-
ber of Russian and Chinese advisors. The pro-Western 9olicy of the mili tarjr may 
have been used by the army to counteract any effort of the Soviet Union and the 
other Communist block coun�ries to undermine the military regime . 
Nkrumah ' s  misuse of power cre3t�d many enemies for him. His ?reventive 
Detention Act empowered him to arrest and imprison anyone who opposed h i s  authority. 
In an effor� to maintain control over Ghana, he appointed members of his poli-
tical party to he.ad many of the governmental a gencies . Most of thes� appointees 
were not only illiterate but were completely ignorant about the agencies to 
which they were assigned. This resulted in misman.sgement, corruption and in-
efficiency in most of the governmental agencie s .  
The first thing the military officers did W3S to remove all of Nkrwnah ' s  
political appointees and fill the facancie s  with efficient Ghanaians and ex-
vatriates a.s the case may be . They also set free about 600 people that NkrumC?.h 
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had imprisoned because of their opposition to �is polici e s .  These G:cticns 
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by the military officers quickly legitim'!..zed the ir authority. 
The major problem the military had to face was unemployment . This result-
ed from the closing down of many state proj ects and industries. In 1968 it 
was estimated that 64, 000 workers were fired . During that same year, about 25% 
of th� labour force was e!!lploye d .  This caused some problems between the 5overn-
ment and the w�ion leaders. This problem was accentuated when the military in 
an austerity measure announced a cut of one percent in salary of some state 
fa.rm workers . Apc:.rt from this unerr.:ployment '.Jroblem, the economic policies of 
tbe army were successful. Ghana 1 s trade deficit on cur::-ent accounts wa.s dropp�d 
from $1200 million in 1965 to $20 million i n  1767. By 1968 the government 2chi�v�d 
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& surplus of $29 million. The gross natiJnal nroduct w�s increas�d from 
o.6% in 1966 to 2 .4% in 1967 . 
This success was due to a great extent to a very strong determination by 
the military to legitimize itself as a respectable institution that was abmre 
the quarrel �nd corruption of politici�ns. A poll conJucted in February of 
1968 showed that 91% of the Ghanaian people wanted th!: military government to 
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continue to rule . 
The significa.nce of this success is th� new image it cre ated for military 
institutions in most of Africa .  ?or most �fricans, the military is no longer 
se�n a s  ' savage • and a vestige of the tool of colonial oppression . �he new 
ima�e is on� of respect and a b�tter substitute for civili 3n government. 
There has not b��n any m�jor critique of the military govern.ment with 
regard to its p�rform�nce . The !Tl.s.j or �eason for this K;.;.s due to th� fact th2t 
there was m commission of inquiry �or the o.ctiviti�s cf the military govern-
m.ent as was found at the .: nd of !\kru.mah 1 s regi'.'.ne o The military relinquished their 
authority to ci vilL?n gover!l.'lle:it through ;, peace'ful gene r2l �l::! ction in which 
chi� u.:.:rty of Jr. :J·.isd�. w�n c.n ovr. ri·.rb�l.ming :najori ty of the se: a.ts in ?arli.!2f1e!lt. 
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Due to this peaceful and legal W3.Y in which the military relinquishe:d its authority, 
the military regime WP.S considc��d by most }hanaizns �s ef�icient 2ni n�n-corrupt. 
Commissions of inquiry were ther�fore unne-ces sary. 
One major thing that happened that rn�y h8ve resulted in disrespect :or the 
2rrny was when it was found that :Jeneral Ankra, a high offic�o.l in the govern-
ment was found guilty of brib�ry �nd corruption. In an �ffort to viniicat� it-
self from corruption the military governrn(::nt quic!dy re:.MOVc� ::ien�rr.l ...:..nkra ..:'rom 
his position in the NationC>.1 Liberation •Jouncil. 
In conclusion therefore . this reserrcb tends to sup?ort my pro: osc-ls tbat 
military involvement in politics will result in: 1) an incrt:.<:-se in defense: 
e�-penditures ;  2 )  an increase in ?Ublic he alth exp�niitures; 3)  a_� inc�easc in 
e conomic development/infra-structure expenditu:-es ( agricultur� ,  industry and . . . . 
trade ) ;  a.�d 4) an increase of expenditure on education. 
In the cc.se of Ghana, one could say that the claims of :·restern experts 
that the military is a modernizing agent holds true . It is a :iiffer�nt thing 
however to s�y that what happened in Ghana can h2ppen in oth�r cou.�tries. One 
could easily make reference t o  Datomey, in which the military has proven itself 
ineffici �nt and corrupt. 
It is worth noting here that almost twenty-seven months after the mili te.r-1 
government relinq�isbed its power, the government of Dr. 5ussia w�s overthrown 
by a.�otber nilitar.,� coup. The re�sons for the coup were similar to those of the 
coup that overhtrew Nkrumah. Thes� reasons include<l: 1 )  problems of inflation; 
2 )  d.t!:crease in cocoa. produc-rAon,; 3 )  a decrease in coco:i prices from a.n averag;!; of 
�;825 per ton in 1970 to $4 �7 .5 in 1972. Inch1dej in the onuses of th� coup 
wets the c:.buse of :n:.2.itary autono;rly an:i :;:-:rerogative s .  A sv.mmary -:>� this K::.s given 
by :�ch'.! a?ong, :ca.der o� the:: cou;- in :;. radio bros.dcast: 
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a'!'he first people which Buesia put his eyes on were 
the armed forces and police. Some .:trmv e.nr3. police officers - " -
were dismissed under the pretext of retirement . Some 
officers we:re '9Ut in certain positions to suit the 
whims of 3ussia '�nd his colleague s .  Then he: started 
taking from us the i'ew amenities �nd fa.cili ties 
which we in th� armed forces �nd the �olice enj�yed 
even under the l�krumah regime- . 
Having lowered morale i n  the arm�d forces and 
the police to the extent that officers could not 
exert :my meaningful influence over their men, so 
that by this strategy c oming together to overthrow 
his govern.ment was to him im�ossible he turned his 
eyes on V.:� ci vilians11 67 
-
Hili tary coup d 1 eta ts will continue being a io:n5.nant phienorn.erw in developing 
arE.as a.s lon� as the que st for or:ler prevails. This quest for order t�kt:s the 
form of mobilizing the masses towards a sense of nati�nal identity to re?l�ce 
tribH.lisrr., b<!tter he:a..lth and � duee.tion a.nd to some degree a.n even distribution 
of the na.tions wealth. As long G.s · the!'e remains a group that d�es feel left out 
or iiscriminated against in terms of the d istribution of wealth, one could 
expect politic.:r.l unrest and thus milit ary tci.ke -overs. 
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